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University technology transfer offices (henceforth, TTOs) play a critical role in the diffusion of innovation and the
development of new technology infrastructure. Studies of the relative efficiency of TTOs have been based on licensing
output measures and data from a single country. In contrast, we present the first cross-country comparison of the
relative performance of TTOs, based on stochastic multiple output distance functions. The additional dimension of
output considered is the university’s propensity to generate start-up companies, based on technologies developed at
these institutions. We find that US universities are more efficient than UK universities and that the production process
is characterized by either decreasing or constant returns to scale. Universities with a medical school and an incubator
are closer to the frontier.
Keywords: Technology transfer office; Technology licensing; University spin-offs (USO) patents; Stochastic distance
functions
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a substantial increase in the rate of commercialization of
intellectual property at US and UK universities. More specifically, universities have attempted
to formalize technology transfer and capture a larger share of the economic rents associated
with technological innovation by establishing technology transfer offices (henceforth, TTOs).
TTOs facilitate technological diffusion through the licensing of a university-based technology
to an existing firm or new venture. Thus, they contribute to the development of new technology
infrastructure. University technology transfer can also potentially yield economic benefits to
the local region, through job and new firm creation or the stimulation of additional research
activity in nearby firms.
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Given the critical managerial and policy implications of university technology transfer,
there is considerable interest in assessing and ‘explaining’ relative performance. Licensing
has traditionally been the most popular mode of university technology transfer (Jensen and
Thursby, 2001).As a result, several studies have used either the number of licenses or licensing
income as the single output.
From the university’s perspective, an advantage of licensing as a mechanism for technology
transfer is that it allows academics to continue their pursuit of research, without devoting effort
to commercialization. However, for certain technologies, patenting and licensing is difficult
or infeasible. Thus, an exclusive focus on licensing might prevent universities from reaping a
substantial return on their intellectual property portfolio.
Therefore, universities might seek more direct involvement in the commercialization of new
technology by ‘spinning off’ a company (Shane, 2002; Shane and Stuart, 2002). Typically,
the university assumes equity in the start-up, and thus, owns a percentage of the company.
Siegel et al. (2003b) report that universities are increasingly focusing greater attention on the
entrepreneurial dimension of technology transfer. As a result, there has been growing interest
in the role of university spin-offs (DiGregorio and Shane, 2003).
With respect to cross-country comparisons, there is a general sense that the UK is not
as advanced as the US in university technology transfer. In the UK, this has engendered a
policy debate concerning the nature of outputs resulting from university technology transfer.
The UK Treasury-sponsored Lambert Review of business–university collaboration (Lambert,
2003) asserted that British universities needed to determine the optimal mix of licensing and
spin-off or licensing activity.
This paper takes an account of these two important trends in university technology transfer:
(1) the tendency of universities to benchmark their performance against domestic and foreign
rivals and (2) the growing emphasis on the entrepreneurial dimension of technology commer-
cialization at universities. More specifically, the study potentially makes two contributions
to the literature. The paper contains the first econometric evidence on the relative efficiency
of university TTOs that is based on multiple outputs. Specifically, we outline and estimate
a stochastic, multiple-output distance function to capture the efficiency of both university
licensing and spin-off generation. We also present the first cross-country comparison of the
relative performance of university TTOs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our specification of
the technology transfer production function and factors that may explain some of the variation
in relative performance across universities. Section 3 presents the econometric model, which
is based on the specification of a stochastic distance function. Section 4 describes the data
and Sec. 5 presents empirical results. Preliminary conclusions and suggestions for additional
research are presented in the final section.
2 INPUTS, OUTPUTS, AND DETERMINANTS OF RELATIVE ‘EFFICIENCY’ IN
UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Studies of the effectiveness of university technology transfer of US universities (e.g., Thursby
and Kemp, 2002; Thursby and Thursby, 2002; Siegel et al., 2003a) have been based on a pro-
duction function framework. Several key stylized facts have emerged from field and survey
research on TTOs (e.g., Thursby et al., 2001; Siegel et al., 2003a), which are relevant to the
specification of this production function. The first is that although faculty members working
on a federal research grant are required to disclose inventions to the university TTO, some
researchers do not comply with this regulation and the rule is rarely enforced. This aberrant
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behavior highlights the critical task of TTO staff in simply eliciting disclosures from fac-
ulty members and thus, increasing the potential pool of potential technologies for licensing.
Technology licensing officers can potentially play an important role by providing ‘busi-
ness coaching’ and encouraging faculty members to engage in entrepreneurial and licensing
activity.
Field research has also revealed that the importance of patents in this process is often
overstated. That is, many firms license technologies long before the university patents them,
if they are patented at all. This occurs for several reasons. First, patent protection may not be
viable or critical for a particular type of technology. For instance, patents are not important
in the computer software industry or in the design of integrated circuits. Second, firms may
have considerable faith in the scientist’s ability or reputation, or because the inventor has a
long-standing financial relationship with the firm.1 Finally, some firms (especially younger,
more entrepreneurial companies) are anxious to lock-in promising embryonic technologies at
a low price.
Another stylized fact culled from interviews of licensing officers is the importance of (exter-
nal) intellectual property lawyers in the process of technology transfer. Some institutions use
these lawyers to help them obtain copyrights and in various aspects of patenting and licens-
ing, especially in support of prosecution, maintenance, litigation, and interference. Indeed,
it is quite common for universities to devote substantial resources to the maintenance and
re-negotiation of licensing agreements, due to the embryonic nature (e.g., uncertainty) of the
technologies and to the fledgling nature of many of the firms that license university-based
technologies. Therefore, we use legal expenditures as an input into the creation of licenses,
licensing income, and university spinouts.
A key difference between the two countries should be noted. In the US, the Bayh–Dole Act
stipulates that scientists must disclose inventions arising from federally funded research to the
university TTO. There is no such legislation in the UK. The 1997 UK Patent Act states that
inventions of employees who may reasonably expect to make inventions are clearly owned
by the employer, so long as it is stated in the employment contract. If ownership is not stated
in an employment contract then the intellectual property right (IPR) belongs to the inventor.
Universities are increasingly exercising their property rights over inventions.
As alluded to earlier, even the presence of the Bayh–Dole Act, Thursby and Kemp (2002)
found typically less than half of faculty inventions with commercial disclosure are dis-
closed to TTOs. Furthermore, the use of an invention disclosure as a proxy for the stock
of technology is context specific. The fact that the UK academics are not required to dis-
close scientific discoveries implies that the true quantity of a university’s pool of available
technologies for commercialization is unobservable. The use of patents as an indicator of
technological input is also problematic because there is substantial variation in quality and in
patenting strategies across universities. Some universities generate numerous patents because
start-up costs are relatively small. However, they also find that cost of enforcing patents is
high and sometimes not worth the effort. In light of the shortcomings of invention disclo-
sures and patents as indicators, we use research expenditure as our measure of technological
input.
There is a perception in the academic literature that equity ownership in a university spinout
might increase the potential upside gain, which appears to be an attractive option to universities.
Evidence from a small set of universities suggests that assuming an equity position in spinout
company yields a higher average long-run than the average return on a license (Bray and
Lee, 2000). The UK treasury-sponsored Lambert review of business–university collaboration
(2003) concluded that British universities were also beginning to emphasize spinout creation.
1 Inventors often use such funds to support graduate students, post-doctoral fellows, and other laboratory costs.
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Thus, in order to evaluate technology transfer performance, we need to assess both licensing
and spinout activity.
Relative efficiency in university technology transfer is also likely to be related to environ-
mental and organizational factors, such as the presence of a medical school on campus and
proxies for the extent to which there is a supportive culture for technology commercialization.
A recent study reports that over 60% of MIT’s university licenses result from a biomedical
invention.2 Bulut and Moschini (2007) conducted an econometric analysis of university licens-
ing income and found that most of the revenue gains were concentrated in private universities
with medical schools.
Experience in spinning out companies and licensing may increase the efficiency of a univer-
sity, as universities ‘learn’ how to become better at creating spinouts and licenses. Our proxy
for experience is the length of time a university has had a TTO. Thus, in our equation ‘explain-
ing’ relative performance, we include a dummy variable denoting whether the university has
a medical school and a measure of the age of the TTO.
Other institutional factors that might explain variation in relative performance are the exis-
tence of a university science park or incubator. Science parks are designed to foster the
formation and growth of innovative firms, provide an environment which enables large compa-
nies to develop relationships with small, innovative firms and promote formal and operational
links with universities and other research institutions (Phan et al., 2005). Incubators, on the
other hand, are focused on the creation and development of new firms (start ups), which are
also concentrated in a limited space.
Finally, regional factors may also be important, such as the R&D intensity of local firms, the
availability of venture capital, and proxies for economic performance. Whether the university
is located in a ‘research active’ region has implications for quality of staff/ agglomeration
effects between business and university.
3 ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Our framework for constructing measures of relative productivity is stochastic frontier esti-
mation, which was developed independently by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den
Broeck (1977). This method generates a production (or cost) frontier with a stochastic error
term that consists of two components: a conventional random error (‘white noise’) and a term
that represents deviations from the frontier, or relative inefficiency.
Assume that the production function can be characterized as:
yi = Xiβ + i (1)
where the subscript i refers to the ith university, y represents technology transfer output,
X denotes a vector of inputs, β is the unknown parameter vector, and  an error term that
consists of two components, i = (Vi − Ui), whereUi is a non-negative error term representing
technical inefficiency, or failure to produce maximal output given the set of inputs used,
and Vi is a symmetric error term that accounts for random effects. Thus, we can rewrite
Eq. (1) as:
yi = Xiβ + Vi − Ui (2)
2 See Pressman et al. (1995).
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Consistent with Aigner et al. (1977), we assume that the Ui and Vi have the following
distributions:
Vi ∼ i.i.d. N
(
0, σ 2v
)
Ui ∼ i.i.d. N+
(
0, σ 2u
)
, Ui ≥ 0 ∼ σ
That is, the inefficiency term,Ui , is assumed to have a half-normal distribution; i.e., universities
are either ‘on the frontier’ or below it.3 Jondrow et al. (1982) specify a functional form for
the conditional distribution of [Ui/(Vi − Ui)], the mean (or mode) of which provides a point
estimate of Ui .
An important parameter in stochastic frontier models is γ = σ 2u /(σ 2v + σ 2u )γ σ , the ratio
of the standard error of technical inefficiency to the standard error of statistical noise, which
is bounded between 0 and 1. Note that γ = 0 under the null hypothesis of an absence of
inefficiency, which would imply that all of the variance in the observed error term can be
attributed to statistical noise. In our empirical analysis, we will formally test this null hypothesis
for each variation of the econometric model.
An important extension of the stochastic frontier literature (see Pitt and Lee, 1981) has
been the ability to incorporate determinants of technical inefficiency into these models. This
extension is crucial to our analysis, since a chief goal of our study is ‘explain’ deviations from
the frontier (i.e., relative inefficiency in university-industry technology transfer (UITT)). Con-
sistent with Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), we conjecture
that the Ui are independently distributed as truncations at zero of the N(mi, σ 2u )σ istribution
with:
mi = Ziθ (3)
where Z is a vector of environmental, institutional, and organizational variables that are
hypothesized to influence relative efficiency and θ is a parameter vector.4
As shown in Battese and Coelli (1995), simultaneous estimation of the production frontier
and inefficiency equations [Eqs. (1) and (2)] by maximum likelihood methods generates esti-
mates of the parameter vectors β and θ , which we can use to compute estimates of relative
productivity. The authors also note that this method is preferable to a two-stage approach,
which involves computing estimates of relative productivity and then running ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions on a set of determinants of establishment-level relative inefficiency.
The problem with the two-stage approach is that it yields inconsistent estimates, since the inef-
ficiency effects in the first stage of the model are assumed to i.i.d., while in the second stage
they are hypothesized to be a function of university-specific factors.
In Sec. 2, we argued that the process of technology transfer is characterized by multiple
outputs: licensing and start-up activity. With multiple outputs, it is appropriate to employ a
‘distance’ function approach, which can be considered as a generalization of the single output
production (or cost) frontier (Fare and Primont, 1990). Distance functions can be estimated
using non-parametric or parametric methods.We choose to estimate the frontier parametrically,
since our intention is to conduct statistical inference.
The distance function can be expressed as:
ln Do = α0 +
M−1∑
m=1
αm ln ym +
K∑
k=1
β ln xk + ln ε (4)
3 Other distributional assumptions for the inefficiency disturbance that have been invoked are truncated normal and
exponential (see Sena, 1999).
4 As discussed in Battese and Coelli (1995), this model can also incorporate panel data.
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Noting that homogeneity implies that:
Do(x, ωy) = ωDo(x, y) (5)
Hence, if we arbitrarily choose one of the outputs, such as the Mth output, and set ω = 1/yM ,
we obtain:
Do
(
x, y
yM
)
= Do (x, y)
yM
(6)
For the Cobb–Douglas case, this yields:
ln(Do/ym) = α0 +
M−1∑
m=1
αm ln y∗ +
k∑
K=1
βK ln xk + ln ε (7)
where y∗ = ym/yM , and can rewrite the distance function more concisely as:
− ln(Do) − ln(yM) = CD
(
x, y
yM, α, β
)
(8)
and hence:
− ln(yM) = CD
(
x, y
yM, α, β
)
+ ln(Do) (9)
Hence if we append a symmetric error term v to account for statistical noise and re-write ln
(Do) as μ, we can obtain the stochastic output distance function, with the usual composite
error term ε = v + μ. We make the standard assumptions that the v are normally distributed
random variables, while the μ are assumed to have a truncated normal distribution:
− ln(yM) = CD
(
x, y
yM, α, β
)
+ v − μ (10)
In the stochastic frontier approach, the predicted value of the output distance function for the
ith firm, Doi = exp(−μ) is not directly observable but must be derived from the composed
error term, εi . Hence, predictions for Do are obtained using Coelli’s Frontier 4.1 program,
based on the conditional expectation Doi = E[(−μ)εi].
The second equation we estimate is the one, which ‘explains’ technical inefficiency for the
ith university (Ui):
Ui = δ0 + δM MEDi + δINC INCUBi + δSCI SCIi + δA AGEi + δGDP REGGDPij
+ δRD REGRDij + δVC REGVCij + μi
where MED, INCUB, and SCI are dummy variables that are equal to 1 if the university has
a medical school, an incubator, or a science park; 0 otherwise, respectively; AGE is the age
of the TTO and REGGDP, REGRD, and REGVC are regional industry GDP, R&D intensity,
and venture capital, respectively, where j denotes the region surrounding the university.
4 DATA
Our primary data source for US universities is the comprehensive survey conducted by the
Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM, 2001). The AUTM file contains
annual data on the number of licensing agreements (NOLIC), royalty income generated by
licenses (LICINC), university startups generated (USO), research income (RESINC), number
of full-time-equivalent employees in the TTO (STAFF), and (external) legal expenditures
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on technology transfer (LEGAL). We also include controls for faculty quality (FACQUAL),
which is proxied in the US by the average ranking of a university’s doctoral programs and in
the UK by the university’s average research assessment exercise score.5
Corresponding data from the UK were derived from a survey conducted in March 2002,
which was then repeated in March 2003. This survey consisted of quantitative and qualita-
tive questions. Given that this is a somewhat new database, we describe it some detail. The
survey was mailed to the top 122 UK universities, as ranked by research income. These institu-
tions were identified using the Higher Education Statistics agency (HESA, 2001) publication
‘Resources of Higher Education Institutions (2000/2001)’. The remaining 45 universities
accounted for only 0.2% of UK universities’ total research grants and contract expenditures
in 2001. We received information for 98 of these top 122 universities. Several institutions
reported numerous zeros. This indicates that the university was not very active in technology
transfer and thus, provided us with only very limited information on this activity. Our final
sample consists of only those institutions that provided complete information in both rounds
of surveys, as we used lagged inputs and determinants of technical inefficiency.
To test whether our sample is representative, we examined the differences between the
universities in our sample of full respondents against the remaining universities. This analysis
indicates that our sample of universities relates to those that are more active in technology
transfer activities.
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive statistics for the inputs and outputs and determinants of relative efficiency are
presented in Table I. Columns 2–4 in Table I present results for the pooled sample. Columns
5–7 and 8–10 contain separate results for the US and the UK, respectively. The representative
university in our sample consummated 29 licensing agreements in 2001, earns $8.4 million
TABLE I Summary statistics for outputs, inputs, and determinants of relative efficiency for 120 US and UK
universities.
Pooled US UK
Standard Standard Standard
Variable N Mean deviation N Mean deviation N Mean deviation
Number of university spinouts 120 3.88 4.15 83 4.27 4.71 37 3 2.31
Number of licenses 120 30.4 44.63 83 39.25 50.6 37 11 13.33
Licensing income ($ mil) 120 8.9 29.4 83 12.6 34.8 37 0.6 1.01
Total research income ($ mil) 120 193 247 83 258 270 37 47.1 69.7
External legal IP expense ($ mil) 120 0.96 1.64 83 1.26 1.9 37 0.30 0.46
Number of TTO staff 120 5.41 6.13 83 4.37 5.25 37 6.85 7.65
Medical school 120 0.62 0.49 83 0.64 0.48 37 0.57 0.50
Science park 120 0.43 0.50 83 0.45 0.50 37 0.38 0.49
Age of TTO 120 14.88 12.07 83 17.10 13.0 37 9.24 7.24
Proportion of research
income from business 120 26.86 191.53 83 32.07 229.81 37 15.16 27.48
Faculty quality 120 3.48 0.86 83 3.15 0.70 37 4.22 0.72
Incubator 120 0.45 0.50 83 0.43 0.50 37 0.49 0.51
GDP per capita ($ mil) 120 28.6 5.9 83 30.4 4.3 37 24.6 7.05
R&D as a % of GDP 120 2.18 1.40 83 2.57 1.42 37 1.30 0.86
Regional VC 120 6.08 8.53 83 4.17 8.70 37 10.38 6.37
5 Both quality indicators are based on the scale: 1–5, where 5 is the highest score.
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in licensing income, spends $176 million on research, employs over five full time workers
in the TTO, and spends $860,000 on external legal fees to protect its intellectual property.
Not surprisingly, US universities have higher levels of outputs and inputs, expect that UK
universities appear to hire more TTO staff. The UK figures are somewhat skewed universities
with zero values for outputs (and thus, many smaller universities) have been excluded from
the analysis.
Table II summarizes the specifications of the technology transfer production functions
and determinants of relative efficiency equations that we estimated. There are three output
specifications: In Model 1, the outputs are the number of USOs and the number of licenses.
Model 2 has the number of USOs and licensing income are the two outputs. Model 3 has three
outputs: the number of licenses, licensing income, and the number of USOs. For each of these
output specifications, we deal with the cross-country analysis in three ways. In version A,
we pool the data. In version B, we have a dummy variable for US universities, while in
version C, we interact the US university dummy with the production function parameters.
Table III presents the results of two key hypothesis tests. The findings indicate that we
can decisively reject the absence of inefficiency. More importantly, the tests reveal that for
each output measure, we should have separate production function parameters for US and UK
universities. This provides strong support for version C. For simplicity, we present the results
for the distance functions using the Cobb–Douglas functional form. More importantly, the
findings in Table III provide strong support for the conjecture that US universities are more
efficient at technology transfer than UK universities.
TABLE II Specifications of university technology transfer production functions and determinants of relative
efficiency.
1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
Outputs
USOs
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Number of licenses
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Licensing income
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Inputs
Total research income
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
External legal IP expenditure
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Number of TTO staff
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
US × total research income √ √ √ √ √ √
US × external legal IP
expenditure
√ √ √ √ √ √
US × number of TTO staff √ √ √ √ √ √
Faculty quality × total
research income
√ √ √ √ √ √
Faculty quality × external IP
expenditure
√ √ √ √ √ √
Faculty quality × number of
TTO staff
√ √ √ √ √ √
Inefficiency models
Dummy for medical school
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Dummy for incubator
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Dummy for science park
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Age of TTO
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Proportion of research
income from business
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Regional GDP per capita
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Regional R&D
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Regional VC
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Faculty quality
√ √ √ √ √ √
US university dummy
√ √ √ √ √ √
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TABLE III Hypothesis tests (nested models).
Critical χ20.95
Null hypothesis λ value† Decision
Output is number of USOs and number of licenses (Model 1)
There is no significant
difference between US
production parameters
and UK production
parameters
H0:βiUS = 0, i = 1, . . . , 3 15.44 7.81 Reject H0; 1B preferred
There is no technical
inefficiency
H0: γ = 0 23.69 11.38 Reject H0
Output is number of USOs and licensing income (Model 2)
There is no significant
difference between US
production parameters
and UK production
parameters
H0:βiUS = 0, i = 1, . . . , 3 14.48 7.81 Reject H0; 2B preferred
There is no technical
inefficiency
H0: γ = 0 12.86 11.38 Reject H0
Output is number of USOs, licensing income and licensing revenue (Model 3)
There is no significant
difference between US
production parameters
and UK production
parameters
H0:βiUS = 0, i = 1, . . . , 3 15.72 7.81 Reject H0; 3C preferred
There is no technical
inefficiency
H0: γ = 0 14.49 11.38 Reject H0
†The critical values for γ = 0 are obtained from table I of Kodde and Palm (1986) due to the mixed χ2 distribution. All other tests
use regular χ2 distributions. The degrees of freedom are q + 1, where q is the number of parameters which are specified to be 0.
Table IV contains maximum likelihood estimates of the output elasticities of the distance
function. The coefficients on STAFF and LEGAL are, for the most part, positive and highly
statistically significant. Research income does not appear to be the critical input in this process.
The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are consistent with previous US studies (Siegel
et al., 2003a). We also find evidence of constant or decreasing returns to scale. This represents
the increase in the normalized output, holding all output ratios constant, since outputs are on
the right hand side of the equation. Therefore, in essence it represents increases in all outputs
keeping output composition constant, i.e., larger TTOs generate less licenses, income, and
spinouts. This is consistent with our previous UK findings (Chapple et al., 2005), which was
based on a single output (either number of licenses or licensing income). In the single output
case, we found decreasing returns to scale, which we attributed to either ‘x inefficiency’ in
TABLE IV Output elasticities of technology transfer inputs.
Model 1C Model 2C Model 3C
Input USO + NUMLIC USO and LICINC USO, NUMLIC, LICINC
ε RESINC 0.01 (0.04) 0.07 (0.06) −0.02 (0.05)
ε STAFF 0.47*** (0.09) 0.38*** (0.11) 0.50*** (0.09)
ε LEGAL 0.44*** (0.12) 0.23 (0.16) 0.44*** (0.11)
Returns to scale
parameter 0.92 0.68 0.92
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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TABLE V Estimated average technical efficiency: parsimonious model.
Output USO, NUMLIC USO, LICINC USO, NUMLIC, LICINC
Model Model 1C Model 2C Model 3C
Estimated technical efficiency 0.73 0.80 0.59
larger TTOs or strategies employed by the TTOs being different, whereby licensing was only
undertaken for lucrative inventions.
Turning to the technical inefficiency scores, Table V reveals that the average efficiency
scores are 0.73, 0.80, and 0.59, using the three different sets of outputs. Computing the aver-
age of these three values, which is 70.7, the results suggest that representative institutions
could increase technology output by approximately 30%. The results for multiple outputs
demonstrate substantially higher levels of efficiency than reported previously for UK univer-
sities, where technical efficiency scores were reported as 0.26 (for number of licenses) and
0.29 (licensing income) in single output models (Chapple et al., 2005).
Table VI presents our empirical results relating to the determinants of technical inefficiency.
A strong result is that universities with a medical school are more efficient. In contrast, the
existence of a university science park does not appear to have an impact on relative efficiency
in technology transfer. On the other hand, universities with an incubator appear to be closer
to the frontier. This finding is perhaps not surprising, since the stated objective of university
incubators is to aid the creation of new firms, typically based on university-owned technologies.
However, the age of the university TTO appears to have the opposite effect from that which
we proposed. That is, we find that older TTOs are less efficient. One interpretation of this
result is that older TTOs are less focused on licensing and, instead, place greater emphasis on
alternative mechanisms of technology transfer, such as placement of students and sponsored
research.6
Direct connections with industry are also important. Universities receiving a higher pro-
portion of their research income from industry are closer to the frontier, although this finding
holds only for the three output specifications. Indirect connections between universities and
local firms in the region appear to be less important, in terms of explaining the relative effi-
ciency of university technology transfer. Of the regional variables, only R&D activity appears
to have significant explanatory power. Contrary to expectations, the availability of venture
TABLE VI Determinants of technical efficiency: parsimonious model
Inefficiency model:
outputs USO, NUMLIC USO, LICINC USO, NUMLIC, LICINC
Model Model 1C Model 2C Model 3C
MED −0.08* (0.02) −0.04* (0.01) −0.03** (0.01)
INCUB −0.02** (0.009) −0.02 (0.02) −0.01** (0.005)
SCI 0.13 (0.12) 0.05 (0.10) 0.16 (0.12)
AGE 0.01 (0.06) 0.01** (0.005) 0.02** (0.007)
PROPBUS −0.02 (0.02) −0.01 (0.01) −0.02** (0.008)
REGGDP 0.03 (002) 0.00 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01)
REGRD −0.02** (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) −0.01** (0.004)
REGVC −0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.03) −0.03 (0.04)
Standard errors are in parentheses. As US dummies are contained in frontier, these are not estimated in
the efficiency model.
Significance: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
6 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
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capital within the university’s local region does not appear to have any effect on relative
performance.
In future research, we intend to include each university’s royalty distribution formula (Link
and Siegel, 2005), which measures the fraction of the licensing revenue that accrues to the
faculty inventor. It might also be useful to separate private and public US universities.
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper makes two potential contributions to the literature. It is the first cross-country
comparison of the relative technology transfer performance of universities. We also extend
previous studies by constructing a multiple output distance function, which includes number
of licenses, licensing income, and new USOs and equity backed USOs. Previous studies have
focused on the number of licenses, licensing income, and university spinout companies in
isolation. A key finding is that US universities are more productive than UK universities in
technology commercialization.
Our finding that there are constant and possibly, decreasing returns to scale in university
technology transfer may reflect the broader-based nature of research disciplines in larger uni-
versities. Recent studies suggest that different scientific disciplines require diverse approaches
to technology transfer (Owen Smith and Powell, 2001). This could influence the relative impor-
tance and feasibility of licensing versus spin-offs between different scientific fields (e.g., life
sciences and engineering). Universities may not have the requisite expertise to identify and
implement the most appropriate mode of commercialization of inventions across the range of
disciplines. This suggests that if universities are to increase the size of their TTOs, they may
need to achieve a match between their range of scientific research disciplines and the subject
backgrounds of their recruits. Still, based on the evidence presented, we must conclude that
there is no evidence to support the assertion that large universities have systematic advantages,
relative to smaller institutions.
The finding of the importance of the availability of early stage venture capital, but not
venture capital in general, is interesting. Problems associated with UK venture capitalists’
investment in early stage high-tech firms are well known (Lockett et al., 2002). There is a
need for universities to develop closer links with those venture capital firms that are interested
in early stage ventures that are emanating from these research institutions. Not all venture
capital firms interested in early stage technology ventures are interested in those created by
universities (Wright et al., 2006). Universities need the expertise to recognize and develop
strong links with venture capitalists who are interested in investing in spin-offs (so-called
‘surrogate’ entrepreneurs). An important part of this process may be to ensure that spin-offs
are ‘investor ready’, which may include addressing concerns about the ownership and control
of the IP to be incorporated into spin-offs. This lends support to the notion of recruiting more
technology transfer officer skills from the private sector and/or attracting business developers
from the private sector that want to step into the spin-off during the pre seed phase and develop
the business plan.
The analysis suggests implications for policy relating to the balance between spin-offs and
licensing in university technology transfer (see e.g., Lambert, 2003; HM Treasury, 2004). The
lower TTO efficiency we identify for multiple outputs than for licensing alone emphasizes the
need for the development of skills that enable TTOs to select between licensing and spin-off as
the most appropriate mode for the commercialization of a particular invention and that there
is scope for achieving an appropriate mix of licensing and spin-offs.
It is debatable whether the skills relevant for licensing are synonymous with those required
for the development of spin-offs. TTOs’ recruitment policies may need to be mindful of
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the need to identify a range of individuals with different skills. For example, developing
links with surrogate entrepreneurs may be appropriate for spin-off activity (Franklin et al.,
2001), while establishing and strengthening links with suitable industry partners may be more
appropriate for licensing activities. Our measure of human capital relates to the number of
TTO staff, without controlling for their expertise or quality. Additional research is needed to
explore the importance of these human capital characteristics, in terms of ‘explaining’ relative
performance.
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